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This essay by Professor Michael T. Morley is a follow-up to his article published in the print 
version of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, “Consent of the 
Governed or Consent of the Government? The Problems with Consent Decrees in 
Government-Defendant Cases” (16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 637 (2014)).  The article was recently 
discussed by Professor James E. Pfander and Daniel D. Birk in a Yale Law Journal article, 
“Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious 
Jurisdiction” (124 Yale L. J. 1345 (2015)). Pfander and Birk’s proposed re-interpretation of 
Article III provides a new basis for allowing federal courts to issue consent decrees. 
Building on the author’s analysis in “Consent of the Governed,” this essay explains why 
requests for consent decrees are non-justiciable under Article III, and Pfander and Birk’s 
thesis unnecessarily overbroad.  When parties have reached accord in a lawsuit, they may 
enter into a settlement agreement—a private contract—to dismiss the case, rather than 
seeking a consent decree. The author explains that, while Pfander and Birk provide numerous 
historical examples of federal courts engaging in ex parte, uncontested proceedings, none 
provides a basis for allowing them to enter binding orders in civil cases where the parties 
have affirmatively reached an agreement.  The author further argues that courts should be 
cautious in relying on Founding Era practices and precedents in construing Article III, since 
many early interpretations and applications of Article III were either erroneous, or at the very 
least fundamentally irreconcilable with modern practice. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, Volume 16 of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Con-
stitutional Law published Consent of the Governed or Consent of the Gov-
ernment? The Problems with Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant 
Cases.1  The article argued that federal courts lack jurisdiction under Arti-
cle III to enter consent decrees:2 
When parties have reached accord as to the proper disposition of a lawsuit, 
there is no longer a live controversy for a court to resolve.  Rather than entering 
a consent decree, the court should require the parties to memorialize their un-
derstanding in a settlement agreement—i.e., a private contract—and dismiss 
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the case without entering a substantive order that specifies or alters the parties’ 
legal rights and obligations.3 
Recently, Professor James E. Pfander and Daniel D. Birk offered a bold 
reinterpretation of Article III’s justiciability requirements.4  Their article is 
breathtaking in its scope and rigorous in its analysis.  Surveying both his-
torical and current practice, Pfander and Birk challenge the widely accepted 
principle—frequently explained as constitutional,5 though recently rechar-
acterized as prudential6—that federal courts may adjudicate only live dis-
putes between adverse parties. 
Pfander and Birk convincingly demonstrate that federal courts, like 
English chancery courts and Roman courts before them,7 have long enter-
tained “a variety of non-adverse or ex parte proceedings.”8  Building pri-
marily on this analysis, they suggest that Article III’s use of two different 
terms—”cases” and “controversies”—to delineate the federal judiciary’s 
jurisdiction suggests that federal courts “may constitutionally exercise not 
one but two kinds of judicial power.”9 
They maintain that Article’s III grant of authority over “controversies” 
confers upon federal courts “contentious jurisdiction,” or the “power to re-
solve disputes between adverse parties.”10  Article III’s grant of jurisdiction 
over “cases,” in contrast, allows federal courts to exercise “voluntary” or 
“non-contentious” jurisdiction, by “entertain[ing] applications from parties 
seeking to assert, register, or claim a legal interest under federal law.”11  A 
federal court may exercise non-contentious jurisdiction over a case even 
when “a genuine dispute between adversaries” does not exist.12  Thus, in 
Pfander and Birk’s view, the Supreme Court may generate crucial constitu-
tional precedents in the absence of either a live dispute or adversarial test-
 
 3 Id. at 644. 
 4 James Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and 
Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346 (2015). 
 5 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 505 (1961) (discussing “the Court’s refusal to entertain 
cases which disclosed a want of a truly adversary contest, of a collision of actively asserted and 
differing claims”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (holding that a 
“controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having  ad-
verse legal interests”). 
 6 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013).  But see id. at 2702 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (stating that adverseness is “an essential element of an Article III case or controversy”); 
Morley, supra note 1, at 659-60 (“Notwithstanding Windsor, it is likely that Article III’s ad-
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 7 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1403-16. 
 8 Id. at 1349. 
 9 Id. at 1355-57, 1424 (emphasis in original). 
 10 Id. at 1355, 1424. 
 11 Id. at 1355. 
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ing,13 although they propose some guidelines to which Congress and feder-
al courts should adhere in determining when the exercise of non-
contentious jurisdiction is appropriate.14 
Pfander and Birk’s compelling intervention provides a fascinating anal-
ysis of the various roles that federal judges and courts have played 
throughout American history.  They also offer an elegant reinterpretation of 
the distinction between cases and controversies under Article III.15  Their 
proposed new conception of Article III’s justiciability requirements calls 
into question the arguments set forth in Consent of the Governed.16  While 
Pfander and Birk’s argument is well-reasoned and appealing, this Essay 
contends that their proposed reinterpretation of Article III goes too far.  
Even assuming that Article III grants federal courts non-contentious juris-
diction to hear certain ex parte or uncontested matters, it should not extend 
so far as to allow federal courts to become or remain involved in matters 
where all interested parties affirmatively agree and seek the same relief.  In 
other words, Article III should not be read as conferring non-contentious 
jurisdiction upon federal courts to enter consent decrees, despite their his-
torical pedigree. 
Part I begins by questioning the utility of Pfander and Birk’s primary 
methodology—a largely historical analysis—in the context of Article III.  
This Part argues that, while deference to the practices of early Congresses 
and Presidential Administrations is generally helpful in resolving separa-
tion-of-powers disputes, it might be a less accurate guide in interpreting 
Article III. 
Part II contends that Pfander and Birk erred in concluding that consent 
decrees are justiciable under Article III.  The historical and current practic-
es from which Pfander and Birk derive their conception of non-contentious 
jurisdiction are susceptible to an alternate analysis:  for a case or controver-
sy to exist, the interested parties must not have not reached an affirmative 
agreement on all issues.  Indeed, Supreme Court precedents rejecting Arti-
cle III jurisdiction over feigned and collusive cases counsel strongly in fa-
vor of prohibiting consent decrees.  This Part goes on to demonstrate that, 
even if one accepts Pfander and Birk’s arguments, consent decrees are not 
justiciable under their proposed conception of non-contentious jurisdiction. 
Part III briefly outlines some of the profound effects that Pfander and 
Birk’s proposed distinction between “cases” and “controversies” can have 
 
 13 Indeed, Windsor itself is arguably an example of constitutional interpretation in a non-
adversarial, advisory context. 
 14 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1358. 
 15 Cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of 
Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 449-50 (1994) (arguing that “[a] dispute between 
parties” is an essential ingredient of “controversies,” but not “cases,” under Article III). 
 16 See Morley, supra note 1, at 637. 
4 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19: 
on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction that may present substantial difficulties 
for their proposal.  The last Part briefly concludes, reiterating the compel-
ling justiciability issues consent decrees raise. 
I.  HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND ARTICLE III 
Pfander and Birk begin their illuminating article by cataloging the vari-
ous types of non-adversarial matters over which federal courts have exer-
cised jurisdiction.17  They maintain that “the widespread appearance of ex 
parte and non-contentious proceedings on the docket of the federal courts,” 
particularly during the Founding Era, constitutes persuasive evidence that 
federal courts may properly exercise jurisdiction over such matters.18  In a 
footnote, Pfander and Birk disclaim “follow[ing] a self-consciously 
originalist line of argument.”19  They instead claim that “the lessons of his-
tory” more generally “provide a framework for a contemporary understand-
ing of the ex parte cases currently heard by federal courts.”20 
Historical practice, especially that of the first Congress and Presidential 
Administration, can be helpful in determining the Constitution’s meaning, 
particularly for issues relating to separation of powers.21  Many early inter-
pretations of Article III, however, even by the Framers themselves, are ei-
ther inaccurate or untenable in the modern world.22  For example, one of 
the first laws enacted by Congress was the Judiciary Act of 1789, establish-
ing the federal court system.23  In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court 
invalidated § 13 of that Act, which purported to allow the Supreme Court 
to exercise original jurisdiction over matters beyond those set forth in Arti-
cle III.24  Though some have questioned whether Marbury interpreted § 13 
 
 17 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1359-91. 
 18 Id. at 1391. 
 19 Id. at 1359 n.37. 
 20 Id. 
 21 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2594 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 22 Early Congresses acted in ways that, in the modern era, would generally be regarded as unconsti-
tutional in areas outside of Article III, as well.  The Sedition Act “made it a crime, among other 
things, to ‘defame’ the Government, the President, or either House of Congress; ‘bring 
them . . . into contempt or disrepute’; or ‘excite . . . hatred’ against them through ‘false, scandal-
ous and malicious’ writings.”  Michael T. Morley, Reverse Nullification and Executive Discre-
tion, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1283, 1289 (2015).  These provisions unquestionably violate most 
modern understandings of the First Amendment. 
  Likewise, President George Washington vetoed a reapportionment bill passed by the Second 
Congress on the grounds that it violated the Apportionment Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, 
by alloting certain states more than one Representative for every 30,000 people, George Wash-
ington, Veto Message (Apr. 5, 1792), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 124 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896). 
 23 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (Sept. 24, 1789). 
 24 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-76 (1803). 
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correctly,25 the fact remains that either the Framers in the first Congress or 
Chief Justice John Marshall (himself a delegate to the Virginia ratifying 
convention) was wrong about the meaning of Article III’s Original Juris-
diction Clause.26 
Marbury also calls into question the wisdom of following Chief Justice 
Marshall’s views on constitutional restrictions on federal judges in another 
way.  Marshall not only adjudicated, in his capacity as Chief Justice, the 
effects of his own actions as Secretary of State,27 but he simultaneously 
served as both Chief Justice and Secretary of State from January 27, 1801 
until March 4, 1801.28  Similarly, Chief Justice John Jay simultaneously 
held both positions for six months.29  While the Constitution does not ex-
pressly prohibit such dual officeholding,30 it violates the Constitution’s 
structural separation-of-powers protections31 and few today would regard it 
as constitutionally permissible.32 
In Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that Article III’s grant 
of jurisdiction to federal courts over controversies between “a State and cit-
izens of another State”33 not only allowed states to initiate federal litigation 
as plaintiffs, but also permitted them to be sued in federal courts.34  Over 
two centuries later, the Supreme Court declared that Chisholm was directly 
contrary to “the persuasive assurances of the Constitution’s leading advo-
cates and the expressed understanding of the only state conventions to ad-
dress the issue in explicit terms.”35  Chisholm “fell upon the country with a 
profound shock,” leading state legislatures to “respond[] with outrage.”36  
The modern Court concluded that Chisholm is not “a correct interpretation 
 
 25 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Marbury’s Wrongness, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 343, 354-55 
(2003). Cf. James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervi-
sory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (2001) (arguing that Marshall interpreted § 13 correctly, 
but chose to interpret the Original Jursidiction Clause narrowly for political reasons). 
 26 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 27 See Letter from John Marshall to James M. Marshall (Mar. 18, 1801), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN 
MARSHALL 90 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1990). 
 28 Louis Michael Seidman, Acontextual Judicial Review, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1143, 1149 n.28 
(2011). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall 
be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”). 
 31 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 515 (2010) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting); see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000). 
 32 But see Paulsen, supra note 25, at 350 n.27 (“[T]here is no . . . prohibition on dual office-holding 
with respect to judicial officers.”). 
 33 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 6. 
 34 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 476-77, 479 (1793). 
 35 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720 (1999). 
 36 Id. 
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of the constitutional design.”37  The Eleventh Amendment was adopted 
shortly after Chisholm to effectively reverse the decision.38 
Hayburn’s Case is another example of Congress’s misapprehension of 
Article III restrictions on the judiciary in the Founding Era.39  As Pfander 
and Birk explain,40 Congress enacted a law authorizing disabled revolu-
tionary war veterans to file petitions with federal courts to request pen-
sions.41  The court would review each petition and supporting evidence in 
an ex parte, uncontested proceeding to determine whether the veteran was 
entitled to relief.  It would then forward its recommendations to the Secre-
tary of War and Congress, which would determine whether the court had 
made an “imposition or mistake,” and decide whether to add the petitioner 
to the pension list.42  Even if one accepts Pfander and Birk’s argument that 
such ex parte proceedings are a constitutionally valid exercise of non-
contentious jurisdiction,43 the act was still unconstitutional because it ren-
dered federal courts’ rulings subject to review by both the legislative and 
executive branches.44  Thus, in its very first session, Congress blatantly ab-
rogated the cornerstone principle of judicial finality.45 
The Circuit Court for New York, which included Chief Justice John Jay 
and Justice William Cushing, opined that circuit judges could continue pro-
cessing veterans’ claims and generating recommendations to the Secretary 
of War in their private capacity as “commissioners.”46  The Government 
sued to determine the validity of pension determinations made by judges in 
their personal capacities.  In an unreported ruling without opinion, United 
States v. Yale Todd, the Court unanimously held that this alternate proce-
dure was not statutorily authorized, and therefore impermissible.47 
 
 37 Id. at 721. 
 38 James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 
CALIF. L. REV. 555, 651 (1994). 
 39 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 409 (1792). 
 40 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1364. 
 41 Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 243, 244. 
 42 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. at 410 n.2. 
 43 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1346. 
 44 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. at 410 n.2 (quoting opinions and letters to the President from three cir-
cuit courts, in which five of the six sitting Supreme Court Justices joined, declaring the Act un-
constitutional). 
 45 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (“Congress cannot vest review of the deci-
sions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch.”); see also William Baude, The 
Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1809 (2008) (“That judgments are constitutionally final has 
recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm.”). 
 46 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. at 410 n.*. 
 47 Minutes of the Supreme Court (Feb. 17, 1794) (noting that the Court ruled in favor of the Gov-
ernment and against the veteran claimant), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1800, at 381 (Maeva Marcus, ed. 1998); see also United 
States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 40, 53 (1851) (discussing unreported ruling in United States v. Todd 
(U.S. 1794)). 
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The Pension Act was by no means an anomaly.  As Pfander and Birk 
recognize, the revenue laws enacted by the First Congress also imposed 
quintessentially non-judicial responsibilities on federal courts.48  The Sec-
retary of the Treasury was authorized to remit penalties and forfeitures im-
posed against importers who, without “willful negligence or any intention 
of fraud,” failed to accurately declare their cargoes.49  Federal courts were 
required to entertain petitions for such relief and transmit their findings of 
fact to the Secretary, who would decide whether to grant remission.50  
Again, this statute effectively transformed the federal courts into a proto-
bureaucracy to conduct initial hearings and make recommendations to ex-
ecutive officials, who alone were empowered to make binding determina-
tions.  This understanding is likely an incorrect interpretation of the Article 
III judicial power ab initio, and is certainly an untenable interpretation to-
day. 
Similarly, “general law” is a longstanding concept embraced by the 
federal judiciary that can be traced back to the Founding Era,51 yet flatly 
violates Article III.  The Rules of Decision Act was part of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, through which the First Congress breathed life into Article 
III.52  The Act specified that, unless federal law requires otherwise, “[t]he 
laws of the several States . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials 
at common law” in federal courts.53  Early federal courts, as exemplified by 
Swift v. Tyson,54 generally construed this provision to mean that they were 
bound to follow state statutes, but not state court rulings, in most diversity 
cases (except those dealing with “local” issues, such as land).  This left 
federal courts free to craft their own “general law” to apply in common-law 
diversity cases.55 
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court famously held that 
this approach was unconstitutional, holding that “no clause in the Constitu-
tion purports to confer” upon federal courts the “power to declare substan-
tive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in 
 
 48 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1366. 
 49 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 122-23. 
 50 Id. at 122. 
 51 See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 
The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1516-17 (1984) (discussing early 
conceptions of general law); see also Charles E. Clark, Professor Crosskey and the Brooding 
Omnipresence of Erie-Tompkins, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 24, 31 (1953) (tracing the Supreme Court’s 
endorsement of general law back to Huidekoper’s Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. 1 (1805)). 
 52 Rules of Decision Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842). 
 55 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (noting the power of the federal courts 
over general law). 
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their nature or ‘general.’”56  Despite ongoing debates over Erie, few today 
would dispute its holding that Article III does not empower federal courts 
to generate their own freestanding body of substantive law (outside the few 
well-defined pockets of federal common law57). 
Though it may be possible to quibble with particular examples, statutes, 
Supreme Court rulings, and other acts of the Framers from the Founding 
Era collectively prove to be a surprisingly unreliable guide in interpreting 
Article III.  Given the numerous fundamentally important ways in which 
such authorities are inconsistent with Article III—and particularly with any 
tenable present-day construction of Article III—it is unclear why early 
practice with regard to non-contentious jurisdiction should be given much 
deference. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONSENT DECREES 
If one does not accept Founding Era practice and longstanding tradition 
as dispositive in construing Article III,58 the constitutionality of consent de-
crees becomes suspect.  A consent decree is a court order that terminates a 
lawsuit (or certain claims in a lawsuit) and imposes obligations on one or 
both litigants based on their consent, without the court reaching the merits 
of the underlying claims.59 
Although the Supreme Court has adjudicated numerous cases involving 
consent decrees, it has not directly affirmed their justiciability.  Citing Swift 
& Co. v. United States,60 Pfander and Birk repeat the common misconcep-
tion that “[t]he Supreme Court has . . . found that the lower federal courts 
have the power to enter consent decrees.”61  The Swift Court, however, 
never actually ruled on the justiciabilty of consent decrees or their propriety 
under Article III.  In Swift, a party to a consent decree collaterally attacked 
it, arguing that the federal court which entered it lacked Article III power to 
do so.  The Supreme Court refused to consider the issue, holding that, even 
 
 56 Id. at 78.  Charles Warren contended that the federal courts had misinterpreted the Rules of Deci-
sion Act, as well.  Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 81-88 (1923).  Reviewing the Act’s legislative history, he argued 
that the phrase “laws of the several states” included state-court rulings, as well.  Id. at 86-88.  But 
see Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 383, 390 (1964) (arguing that the Erie Court “[t]oo quickly accept[ed] Warren’s thesis”). 
 57 Paul Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”:  Competence and Discretion in the Choice of 
National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 799 (1957). 
 58 See supra Part I (offering evidence that Founding Era practices and interpretations cannot be 
treated as a definitive guide for interpreting Article III in the present day). 
 59 Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986). 
 60 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928). 
 61 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1387. 
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if the lower court had “erred in deciding that there was a case or controver-
sy, the error is one which could have been corrected only by an appeal.”62 
Pfander and Birk contend that their theory of non-contentious jurisdic-
tion provides a new constitutional basis for consent decrees.  They explain 
that federal courts may exercise two types of non-contentious jurisdiction:  
“original jurisdiction” over any matters (including uncontested or ex parte 
proceedings) in which a litigant asserts a claim of right, and “ancillary ju-
risdiction” over uncontested issues “in a dispute between actual or potential 
adversaries.”63  Consent decrees, they maintain, are a valid exercise of an-
cillary non-contentious jurisdiction because they “settle disputes between 
contending parties.”64  They explain that courts’ power to issue consent de-
crees “grows out of their duty, in any case properly before them, to provide 
parties with the relief to which the applicable law entitles them.”65 
Despite Pfander and Birk’s powerful argument, consent decrees violate 
Article III.  When litigants in a case agree on all issues, and are jointly 
seeking the same relief from a court in all respects, a live dispute no longer 
exists between them. A federal court therefore lacks Article III authority to 
remain involved.  The litigants instead may embody their understanding in 
a settlement agreement.66   
Part II.A offers an alternate conception of non-contentious jurisdiction 
that is consistent with most of the historical practices that Pfander and Birk 
discuss.  This Part contends that, for a case or controversy to exist, the in-
terested parties must not have reached an affirmative agreement on all is-
sues.  Under this competing conception of non-contentious jurisdiction, 
consent decrees are impermissible.  Supreme Court precedents rejecting 
feigned or collusive jurisdiction counsel strongly in favor of this proposed 
re-interpretation.  Part II.B demonstrates that, even if one accepts Pfander 
and Birk’s conception of non-contentious jurisdiction, consent decrees still 
likely run afoul of it. 
 
 62 Id.  Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944), is the closest the Court has come to directly 
affirming the validity of consent decrees.  Pope held, “It is a judicial function and an exercise of 
the judicial power to render judgment on consent.  A judgment upon consent is a ‘judicial act.’”  
Id.  Pope, however, did not involve a consent decree, and none of the cases it cited for this prop-
osition (including Swift) considered or ruled upon consent decrees’ justiciability.  Id. 
  Moreover, Pope stated that a case is justiciable if a court is required to “determine[] that the un-
challenged facts shown of record establish a legally binding obligation” and “adjudicate[] the 
plaintiff’s right of recovery and the extent of it.”  Id.  When litigants jointly agree to a consent 
decree and submit it for judicial approval, the court performs neither function.  Local No. 93, 478 
U.S. at 519. 
 63 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1440-41. 
 64 Id. at 1441. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Morley, supra note 1, at 675. 
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A.  An Alternate Interpretation of the History 
Based primarily on their exhaustive survey of ex parte and other uncon-
tested matters in federal courts, Pfander and Birk conclude that Article III 
confers non-contentious jurisdiction upon federal courts.  This jurisdiction 
empowers them to adjudicate or administer claims on a “consensual basis,” 
despite the absence of a “genuine dispute between adversaries.”67  This Part 
distills a slightly different principle from the practices upon which Pfander 
and Birk rely.  Most of these practices instead may be read as allowing fed-
eral courts to exercise jurisdiction, including on an ex parte basis, over mat-
ters that require governmental intervention because the interested parties 
have not reached an affirmative agreement on all issues. 
In some of their examples, the whole reason that litigation exists in the 
first place is because the opposing party will not consent to the relief the 
plaintiff seeks.  In prize and salvage cases,68 for example, claimants sought 
ex parte relief from federal district courts to obtain a legal interest in the 
ships they captured or rescued.  If the ships’ owners consented to transfer-
ring title, or were willing to pay the money the claimants sought, judicial 
proceedings would be unnecessary; the parties themselves could handle 
such transfers privately.  Ex parte prize and salvage cases were necessary 
precisely because the ship owners neither consented nor cooperated. 
The same is true of bankruptcy cases69 (as well as the forerunner to 
modern bankruptcy law, uncontested equity receiverships70) and default 
judgments.71  When a bankruptcy petition is uncontested, it does not sug-
gest that the creditors agree to the reduction or elimination of the debtor’s 
obligations.  To the contrary, if creditors were individually or collectively 
willing to renegotiate or waive a debtor’s debts, there would be no need for 
bankruptcy proceedings.72  Likewise, if a defendant who fails to file an an-
swer actually recognized the plaintiff’s right to relief, it could simply pay 
the plaintiff the damages she seeks or enter into a contract promising to 
perform (or refrain from performing) conduct the plaintiff seeks to enjoin.  
Thus, a meaningful distinction exists between mere lack of opposition and 
affirmative consent. 
Ex parte applications for seizures of counterfeit goods that infringe on 
trademarks, search warrants, and FISA warrants are subject to a similar 
analysis.73  If the plaintiff or Government had, or was likely to obtain, the 
target’s consent to the search or seizure, court orders would be unneces-
 
 67 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1355. 
 68 Id. at 1367-70. 
 69 Id. at 1371-74. 
 70 Id. at 1386. 
 71 Id. at 1384. 
 72 Morley, supra note 1, at 671. 
 73 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1370-71, 1375-79. 
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sary.  Some other examples that Pfander and Birk discuss, such as initial 
judicial screening of certain post-conviction prisoner filings,74 similarly 
arise in a context where the parties dispute the underlying legal issues. 
Even court orders granting witness immunity75 are necessary only when 
a witness refuses to voluntarily accept immunity in exchange for his testi-
mony.  When a witness is amenable to providing immunized testimony, the 
Government may unilaterally confer legally binding “letter immunity” or 
“informal immunity” without a court order.76  It should be noted that, even 
under Pfander and Birk’s understanding of non-contentious jurisdiction, the 
constitutionality of judicial proceedings for the sole purpose of conferring 
immunity is questionable, since the court’s role is purely “ministerial”77 
and there are no substantive statutory criteria the court must ensure have 
been satisfied.78 
This Part’s proposed re-interpretation of non-contentious jurisdiction is 
insufficient to explain two main practices:  guilty pleas and consent de-
crees.  Guilty pleas arise in criminal cases, however, and it is not clear that 
Article III’s justiciability principles apply equally in that context.  In any 
event: 
[T]he practice of accepting guilty pleas may be justified by compelling consid-
erations that do not apply to consent decrees in civil cases . . . .  Having courts 
accept guilty pleas and enter judgments of conviction protects the constitutional 
rights of the defendant; ensures that waivers of those rights are knowing, intel-
ligent, and voluntary; allows courts to maintain at least a degree of oversight 
over the executive branch’s prosecutorial power; and places a judicial imprima-
tur on convictions.79 
 
 74 Id. at 1381-83. 
 75 Id. at 1380-81. 
 76 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 719 (“Testimony given under informal 
immunity is not compelled testimony, but is testimony pursuant to an agreement and thus volun-
tary.”).  The main distinction between letter immunity and formal immunity is that the former 
protects against only subsequent federal prosecutions, whereas the latter protects against state 
prosecutions, as well. 
 77 Id. at § 723; see also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1956) (holding that a court 
lacks “discretion to deny the [immunity] order on the ground that the public interest does not 
warrant it”); cf. Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1447 (“[T]he federal courts may accept non-
contentious assignments only where the task at hand involves the exercise of judicial, rather than 
ministerial, judgment.”). 
  Pfander and Birk cite Ullmann for the proposition that courts may issue immunity orders not on-
ly to unwilling witnesses, but also where the witness is willing to accept the Government’s grant 
of immunity.  Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1381.  Ullmann did not actually address that ques-
tion, however, since the witness in that case strenuously opposed the judicial grant of immunity 
that the Government was attempting to procure.  Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 425.  Thus, despite 
longstanding practice, it appears that the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether an 
uncontested application to a federal court for immunity—particularly outside the context of some 
ongoing case, and in light of the ministerial nature of the task—constitutes a “case or controver-
sy” over which it may exercise Article III jurisdiction. 
 78 See 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a). 
 79 Morley, supra note 1, at 672. 
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No such compelling institutional reasons justify the use of consent de-
crees.  When litigants have reached accord on all outstanding legal issues in 
a case, they may reduce their understanding to a legally binding settlement 
agreement.  The fact that the litigants may desire the ability to enforce their 
agreement through contempt, rather than traditional breach-of-contract 
remedies, does not entitle them to judicial relief.  When all parties to a dis-
pute have reached complete agreement on the matter, a “case” or “contro-
versy” ceases to exist, the court has no further role to play, and a resolution 
may be achieved through private ordering.80 
As the Supreme Court held in Lord v. Veazie, “It is the office of courts 
of justice to decide the rights of persons and of property, when the persons 
interested cannot adjust them by agreement between themselves[]—and to 
do this upon the full hearing of both parties.”81  A ruling entered in the ab-
sence of such adverseness is not a “judgment,” but “a nullity.”82  It is one 
thing for federal courts to entertain non-contentious jurisdiction over un-
contested ex parte matters where adverse litigants have not reached an 
agreement, and the court’s involvement is necessary to effectuate some 
change in legal status or rights.  It is quite another for the court to do so 
where such an affirmative, express agreement exists, and litigants simply 
want the court to place its imprimatur on their arrangement.  By the time a 
dispute reaches that stage, any “case” or “controversy” has evaporated, and 
the parties are fully capable of adjusting their legal rights or status among 
themselves.83 
B.  Consent Decrees and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction 
Even if one accepts Pfander and Birk’s conception of non-contentious 
jurisdiction, consent decrees still likely remain non-justiciable, for at least 
two reasons.  First, they maintain that non-contentious jurisdiction—in par-
ticular, what they term “ancillary” non-contentious jurisdiction—grows out 
of the duty of federal courts “to provide parties with the relief to which ap-
plicable law entitles them.”84  When a court enters a consent decree, how-
ever, it does not determine whether any law was violated85 or “the plaintiff 
established his factual claims and legal theories.”86  Instead, the court puts 
 
 80 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 76 (2006). 
 81 49 U.S. 251, 255 (1850). 
 82 Id.; see also Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 47-48 (1971) (holding 
that, where “both litigants desire precisely the same result,” there is “no case or controversy”). 
 83 See Morley, supra note 1, at 666 n.164 (collecting cases). 
 84 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1441. 
 85 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992). 
 86 United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971).  See generally Local No. 93, Int’l 
Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986) (establishing standards for 
approval of consent decrees). 
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its prestige and authority behind a private settlement between the parties, 
without assessing the extent to which it correctly embodies the parties’ re-
spective rights and obligations.  Although a consent decree assumes the 
trappings of judicial power, in many respects it represents the abrogation of 
such power.  The court is primarily enforcing the wishes of the parties, not 
the demands of the law.87 
Second, consent decrees do not appear to fall within Pfander and Birk’s 
conception of either “cases” or “controversies.”  In their view, Article III 
permits courts to hear a case, even on an ex parte and uncontested basis, 
where a party asserts its rights, without regard to the presence of an adver-
sary.88  Consent decrees cannot be considered a valid exercise of jurisdic-
tion over “cases” because, as discussed above, they do not purport to de-
termine or enforce a party’s legal rights, but rather reflect the private 
ordering of formerly adverse litigants. 
Under Pfander and Birk’s view, a “controversy,” in contrast, requires 
adverse litigants.  By the time a dispute reaches the stage where the parties 
ask the court to enter a proposed consent decree, an underlying controversy 
no longer exists.  Moreover, unlike other examples of ancillary non-
contentious jurisdiction that Pfander and Birk discuss, such as default 
judgments and even guilty pleas,89 consent decrees are unnecessary to ad-
just the legal rights or status of formerly adverse litigants because the par-
ties can embody their understanding in a settlement agreement.  The fact 
that the parties may wish their settlement agreement to be backed by differ-
ent or stronger remedies (for example, contempt sanctions) does not entitle 
them to invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts any more than parties en-
tering into any other type of contract.  Thus, even those persuaded by 
Pfander and Birk’s compelling conception of non-contentious jurisdiction 
need not embrace consent decrees as a valid exercise of the Article III judi-
cial power. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
Pfander and Birk’s argument also has implications for the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court that their article does not touch upon.  After identify-
ing the three different types of “cases” and six types of “controversies” to 
which the federal judicial power extends, Article III goes on to specify: 
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and 
those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original ju-
risdiction.  In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall 
 
 87 Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 522. 
 88 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1346; see also id. at 1357, 1439-40. 
 89 Id. at 1441. 
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have appellate jurisdiction . . . with such exceptions . . . as the Congress shall 
make.90 
Pfander and Birk contend that the terms “case” and “controversy” in 
Article III bear very different meanings, and that the Framers’ use of two 
distinct terms was deliberate and meaningful.91  If that view is accurate, 
then Article III’s exclusive use of the term “cases” in the very next clause, 
which sets forth the scope of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, is conse-
quential.  Their interpretation suggests that the Supreme Court lacks juris-
diction, either original or appellate, over any of the “controversies” identi-
fied in Article III that do not also qualify as “cases.”92  In other words, 
lower federal courts would be authorized to hear many types of “controver-
sies” over which the Supreme Court lacks appellate jurisdiction, such as 
state-law disputes between U.S. and foreign citizens.93 
Moreover, under Pfander and Birk’s proposed definitions, the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction would include potentially non-contentious matters 
(cases), while excluding categorically adversarial matters (controversies).  
This may be the opposite of the jurisdictional restrictions one would expect 
for the Court. 
Finally, there is a textually reasonable argument that Article III actually 
uses the terms “cases” and “controversies” interchangeably.  The provision 
quoted above grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over “cas-
es . . . in which a state shall be a party.”94  Article III also provides, howev-
er, that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over various types of “con-
troversies” in which a state is a party.95  One possible implication of these 
provisions is that the Framers treated the terms “case” and “controversy” as 
synonymous.96  In any event, Article III’s provisions concerning the Su-
 
 90 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1-2 (emphasis added). 
 91 Pfander & Birk, supra note 4, at 1417-18. 
 92 For example, Article III allows federal courts to exercise jurisdictions over “controversies to 
which the United States shall be a party.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  Most such matters, 
however, would likely arise under federal law, and therefore also constitute federal question cas-
es over which a federal court may exercise jurisdiction.  Id. 
 93 Pfander and Birk’s view also resolves the question of whether the Supreme Court can hear ap-
peals of state supreme court rulings adjudicating issues under the U.S. Constitution or federal 
law, when those cases could not have been initially brought in federal court due to non-
justiciability.  Cf. William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court 
Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 (1990) (arguing that state courts 
should be limited by Article III justiciability requirements when adjudicating federal question 
cases).  Pfander and Birk's theory would allow the Supreme Court to exercise non-contentious ju-
risdiction over many such cases, despite the absence of a justiciable controversy. 
 94 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 95 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 96 Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 244 n.128 (1985) (pointing out that, in the Original Jurisdic-
tion Clause, “the several categories of ‘Controversies’ to which a state is party in the jurisdic-
tional menu are referred to as ‘Cases,’ thus suggesting that the two words are legally synony-
mous”).  Of course, it could be argued instead that the Original Jurisdiction Clause allows the 
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preme Court’s jurisdiction present potentially substantial obstacles to 
Pfander and Birk’s theory of non-contentious jurisdiction and the interpre-
tation of Article III upon which it rests. 
CONCLUSION 
Consent decrees pose a largely unrecognized challenge to Article III’s 
justiciability requirements.  The Supreme Court has never squarely ad-
dressed their constitutionality,97 and several of its rulings concerning Arti-
cle III’s adverseness requirement raise serious problems for their validity.98 
Even under Pfander and Birk’s proposed new theory of non-contentious ju-
risdiction under Article III, consent decrees still likely fall outside the fed-
eral judicial power. 
 
Supreme Court to hear only disputes in which a state is a party that also qualify as cases.  Under 
this reading, the Court would possess original jurisdiction over any federal-question, admiralty, 
or ambassador-related cases in which a state is a party.  See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 97 Cf. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 313-15 (1928) (refusing to adjudicate Article III 
challenge to validity of consent decree because the issue had not been raised on direct appeal); 
see also Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1944) (asserting, incorrectly, that Swift & Co. es-
tablished the constitutional validity of consent decrees). 
 98 See, e.g., Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 47 (1971) (holding that 
“no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III” exists where “both litigants desire pre-
cisely the same result”); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 255 (1850) (“It is the office of courts of 
justice to decide the rights of persons and of property, when the persons interested cannot adjust 
them by agreement between themselves - and to do this upon the full hearing of both parties.”); 
see also Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 271, 274, 276 (1974). But see United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013) (characterizing the adverseness requirement as prudential 
rather than constitutionally mandated). 
